Asset Price Bubbles and Crashes with Near-Zero-Intelligence Traders: Towards an Understanding of Laboratory Findings by John Duffy & M. Utku Unver
Asset Price Bubbles and Crashes with
Near-Zero-Intelligence Traders
Towards an Understanding of Laboratory Findings∗
John Duﬀy
University of Pittsburgh
M. Utku ¤ Unver
Ko‚ cU n i v e r s i t y
First Draft: July 2003
Revised: February 2004
Abstract
We examine whether a simple agent￿based model can generate asset price bubbles and
crashes of the type observed in a series of laboratory asset market experiments beginning with the
work of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). We follow the methodology of Gode and Sunder
(1993, 1997) and examine the outcomes that obtain when populations of zero￿intelligence (ZI)
budget constrained, arti￿cial agents are placed in the various laboratory market environments
that have given rise to price bubbles. We have to put more structure on the behavior of the ZI-
agents in order to address features of the laboratory asset bubble environment. We show that our
model of ￿near￿zero￿intelligence￿ traders, operating in the same double auction environments
used in several diﬀerent laboratory studies, generates asset price bubbles and crashes comparable
to those observed in laboratory experiments and can also match other, more subtle features of
the experimental data.
JEL Classi￿cation Nos. D83, D84, G12.
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his data set.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) devised a laboratory double auction market that gives rise
to asset price bubbles and crashes as evidenced by the behavior of inexperienced human subjects
who are placed in this environment. The Smith et al. (1988) ￿nding of price bubbles and crashes
has been replicated by several other experimentalists and found to be robust to a number of
modi￿cations of the laboratory environment speci￿cally aimed at eliminating bubbles.1
Ad i ﬃculty with these laboratory asset markets is that they do not map easily into existing
theories of price determination in markets with a single common￿value good. Most of the laboratory
markets that give rise to bubbles have ￿nite horizons and are set up in such a way that rational,
pro￿t￿maximizing agents would never choose to engage in any trade. By contrast, the theoretical
bubble literature demonstrates how bubbles can arise in in￿nite horizon environments despite
the fact that agents are (typically) homogeneous and have rational expectations.2 These rational
bubble theories are therefore of little use in understanding the laboratory asset bubble phenomenon.
Surprisingly, the experimentalists themselves have little to say as to why bubbles and crashes
regularly occur and appear to be puzzled by their own inability to eliminate asset bubbles in a
wide range of laboratory environments. As Smith et al. (2000) notes, these ￿controlled laboratory
markets price bubbles are something of an enigma.￿
Our aim in this paper is to take a further step toward understanding the laboratory asset price
bubble and crash phenomenon, not by conducting additional experiments with paid human subjects,
but by placing a population of arti￿cial adaptive agents in the same laboratory environments that
have given rise to price bubbles and determining how the arti￿cial agents must behave so as to
generate the asset price bubbles and related features found in the experimental data.3 Theoretical
analysis of individual behavior in the double auction market mechanism has turned out to be quite
diﬃcult due to the large multiplicity of equilibria that are possible in this environment (Friedman
1Smith et al.￿s original (1988) bubble ￿ndings have been replicated by King et al. (1993), Smith et al. (2000)
and Lei et al. (2001), among others, using similar experimental designs. In addition, these authors and others, (e.g.
van Boening et al. (1993), Porter and Smith (1995), Fisher and Kelly (2000) and Noussair et al. (2001)), have also
examined departures from the original Smith et al. (1988) protocol with an eye toward eliminating or attenuating
asset price bubbles in experiments with inexperienced subjects.
2See, for example, Blanchard (1979), Tirole (1985), Diba and Grossman (1987), O￿Connell and Zeldes (1988),
Froot and Obstfeld (1991) and the references contained therein.
3This agent￿based computational (ACE) approach represents a new ￿bottom￿up￿ (as opposed to ￿top￿down)
methodology to understanding boundedly rational behavior in dynamic, stochastic environments with heterogeneous
agents. See Tesfatsion￿s web site, http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm for a thorough description of
the ACE methodology, as well as bibliographies of and pointers to ACE research papers.
1(1993)). Agent￿based techniques provide an alternative means of gaining insight into the features
of these environments that may be responsible for generating asset price bubbles and crashes in
laboratory studies.4
At the same time, agent￿based models are subject to a number of arbitrary modeling decisions.
We address this diﬃculty in two ways. First, we attempt to use the simplest model of agent
behavior. In particular, we follow Gode and Sunder￿s (1993, 1997) approach of using ￿budget-
constrained zero￿intelligence machine traders￿ as a means of focusing attention on the institutional
features, e.g. the rules of the laboratory market environment. As we show later in the paper, we
have to modify the basic zero￿intelligence (ZI) approach in several respects in order to capture
features of the experimental data we seek to understand. However, the modi￿cations we make are,
again, the simplest possible; indeed we explore the marginal contribution of the two modi￿cations
we have to make to the ZI methodology and show how both are critical to our ￿ndings.
Second, we impose further discipline on our modeling exercise by requiring that our arti￿cial
agent simulations match several key features of the experimental data as reported in the various
laboratory studies that have given rise to bubbles. We then ask how the data from the simulations
match other, more subtle features of the data. We also explore the performance of our calibrated
baseline model in other experimental designs that have been proposed in an eﬀort to eliminate
bubbles without recalibrating our model to better ￿t data in these alternative environments. Our
main ￿nding is that asset price bubbles of the type observed in certain laboratory markets can
be generated using a very simple agent￿based model where trading is subject to the rules of the
laboratory market and where individual bids and asks are subject to budget constraints.
Unlike Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997), we are not interested in the eﬀect of various market
procedures on allocative eﬃciency; instead our aim is to determine whether our calibrated agent-
based model can deliver, both qualitatively and quantitatively, results that are similar to those
found in a variety of diﬀerent laboratory studies. Thus we examine the performance of our base-
line, calibrated model in alternative market environments that experimentalists have proposed and
examined in an eﬀort to eliminate asset pricing bubbles. We ￿nd that our model continues to track
experimental results well in these other environments even though it is not calibrated to match
any of the features of these other environments. Finally, we redo our calibration exercise for a
diﬀerent version of the laboratory bubble environment proposed by Lei et al. (2001) where agents
are restricted to be either buyers or sellers. For this environment, we eliminate the weak foresight
aspect of our model, whereby the probability of being a buyer decreases over time. A calibration
4Researchers have only recently begun to use agent￿based modeling techniques to understand and predict behavior
in experimental studies with real human subjects. See, e.g., Duﬀy (2004) for a survey of this literature.
2of this simpler model continues to perform well in tracking the features of the data observed in
the Lei et al. experiment. We conclude that agent￿based modeling approaches provide one means
of assessing new experimental designs or market mechanisms designed to eliminate or reduce the
frequency of asset price bubbles.
2 Laboratory Market Price Bubbles
The original market environment of Smith et al. (1988) involved 9 or 12 inexperienced traders
who participated in T = 15 or 30 trading periods of a computerized market. Each subject began
the experimental session with an endowment of x units of cash and y units of the single asset. In
each trading period, subjects could submit both bid and ask prices for a unit of the asset (only
one unit could be traded at a time) subject to budget/endowment constraints. Bid or ask prices
that did not improve on pre￿existing bid or ask prices were ranked relative to the current best bid
and ask prices and placed in an order book queue. Agents were free to buy or sell a unit at a time
at the current best bid or ask prices which were the only prices shown on each subjects￿ trading
screens. When a unit was sold, the inventory and cash balances of the two traders were adjusted
accordingly, and the transaction price was revealed to all traders. The next best bid and ask prices
from the queue became the new best available bid and ask prices on all traders￿ screens. Trading
was halted at the end of each 240 second trading period.
Following the completion of each trading period, subjects earned a dividend payment per unit
of the asset that they owned at the end of the period. The dividend amount was a random variable
consisting of a uniform draw from a distribution with support: {d1,d 2,d 3,d 4} where 0 ≤ d1 <d 2 <
d3 <d 4, so the expected dividend payment was ﬂ d = 1
4
P4
i=1 di. After dividends were paid out,
provided the last trading period T had not been reached, another 240 second trading period would
commence.
At the beginning of each experimental session, i.e. before the start of trading period t =1 ,
player i￿s initial cash balance, xi, and endowment of the single asset, yi satisfy:
xi + D
T
1 yi = c
where c is a constant that is the same for all i. Given that all traders have the same expected
value for their initial endowment at the start of the experiment, they should be indiﬀerent between
not trading in any period, or trading at the fundamental market price in period t,w h i c he a r n s
them zero pro￿ts.5 Since players are told the session will last T periods, the fundamental expected
5If there are small costs to such trades, then the no trade outcome is unique.
3market price of the asset at the beginning of trading period t is:
D
T
t = ﬂ d(T − t +1 )+D
T
T+1,
and is decreasing as t → T. Here, D
T
T+1 denotes the expected default (buy￿out) value of the asset
after period T. If there are any trades, the traded prices should track the fundamental expected
market price, D
T
t over time and should steadily decrease by an increment of ﬂ d per trading period.
Following the start of the experiment, individual agents￿ cash endowments and inventories
become endogenous, re￿ecting individual trading decisions. Endowments were not reinitialized
at the start of each new trading period. Dividend earnings from the previous period become
available for making cash purchases in the following period. All trades are allowed provided that
the two parties to a trade have the necessary asset and cash endowments to complete the trade;
these endowment amounts are updated in real time in the laboratory session using computerized
software, and we follow the same practice in the arti￿cial agent simulations. At the end of T trading
periods, the standard practice was to pay out the period T dividend realization amounts per share
and then pay out the default (buy-out) value of the asset.
The basic ￿nding reported by Smith et al. (1988) is that with inexperienced subjects, there is a
considerable volume of trade especially in the early periods of the market, and that the mean traded
price exhibits a ￿hump-shaped￿ pattern. Initially the mean traded price lies below the fundamental
price, but quickly soars above this fundamental price. Substantially higher than fundamental prices
are sustained for some number of trading periods near the middle of the session despite the declining
fundamental value of the asset. Such a sustained departure of prices from fundamentals is labeled
a ￿bubble￿ by the experimenters.6 Finally, sometime during the last few trading periods, a market
crash becomes a likely event, with the mean traded price falling precipitously to values close to
or even below the fundamental asset value. This hump-shaped path for mean traded prices is the
most well￿known signature of the laboratory asset market bubble. However, there are other, more
subtle relationships between prices, bids and oﬀers and trading volume that also characterize these
laboratory asset market bubbles. We will address these relationships later in the paper.
Asset bubbles in laboratory markets tend to disappear when agents have garnered experience
with the market environment as Smith et al. (1988) also demonstrate. Consequently, experimental
research on the source of laboratory asset price bubbles has naturally focused on the behavior of
inexperienced subjects.7 We emphasize at the outset that the model we set forth below is not
6Somewhat surprisingly, the experimenters have not adopted a precise de￿nition as to what constitutes a ￿bubble￿
or a ￿crash.￿ Instead, there is a certain ￿call-them-as-they-see-them￿ approach to characterizing whether bubbles or
crashes have occurred. An exception is Noussair et al. (2001) as discussed later in the paper.
7These inexperienced subjects might be likened to the noise￿traders found in the ￿nance literature on asset price
4intended as a model of behavior by experienced market players; rather it is a model of play by
inexperienced market participants only. Furthermore, our use of ￿near zero￿intelligent￿ traders
is not intended as a commentary on the rationality of the human subjects; rather it should be
interpreted as providing a lower bound on possible behavior in market game environments with
inexperienced players.8
In subsequent experimental research, Smith et al. (2000) and Lei et al. (2001) have come closest
to eliminating bubbles with inexperienced subjects, though they are not completely successful in
this eﬀort. Smith et al. (2000) examine environments that diﬀer in the frequency with which
dividends are paid out, while Lei et al. (2001) consider environments where traders are prevented
from making speculative trades and where another market for a non￿asset, consumption good is
also in operation. Smith et al. (2000) ￿nd that bubbles are most unlikely (but can still occur) when
the asset only pays a single random dividend following the last trading period, T,w h i l eL e ie ta l .
(2001) ￿nd that bubbles are most unlikely (but can still occur) when traders are prevented from
speculating and another, non￿asset market is in operation, so that subjects are less predisposed to
be actively engaged in the asset market. Lei et al. (2001) motivate their two market treatment
with the following statement:
￿Because the data are diﬃcult to reconcile with the theory, it is natural to conjecture
that aspects of the methodology of this type of asset market experiment are the sources
of the errors in decision making (p. 846).￿
After ￿nding that their various manipulations of the market environment do not always prevent
bubbles from occurring, they rule out one possible explanation:
￿We do not interpret our data as suggesting that the conscious pursuit of capital gains
does not occur in experiments of this type (p. 857).￿
Our focus in this paper is also on whether features of the design of this type of asset market
experiment are responsible for the seemingly anomalous price bubble ￿ndings. However, rather than
supposing that subjects are rational or even conscious pro￿t maximizers, we follow the approach
of Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) and assume just the opposite: that traders are unconscious,
volatility, see, e.g. DeLong et al. (1990). Populations with a mix of both inexperienced and experienced traders have
yet to be considered experimentally.
8Indeed, in a very stimulating paper, Brewer et al. (2002) show that in double auction, buyer-seller markets where
demand and supplies are continously refreshed, the behavior of inexperienced human subjects is quite diﬀerent from






Class I ($2.25; 3) 3
Class II ($5.85; 2) 3
Class III ($9.45; 1) 3
Dividends d ∈ {$0,$0.04,$0.14,$0.20}a d =0 .12
Initial Value of a Share D
T
1
b =$ 3 .60
Buy-out Value of a Share DT
T+1 =$ 1 .80
a Each dividend outcome occurs with probability 1
4.
bEach period￿s expected fundamental value is denoted by D
T
t for t =1 ,...,T+1 . T h e s ev a l u e sw e r e
calculated and displayed on the screen in each trading period in the human subject experiments.
Table 1: Smith et al. (1988) Experimental Design 2
irrational, near￿zero intelligence agents who make random bids and oﬀers subject to certain market
constraints. This approach allows us to disentangle the potential sources of asset price bubbles in
these laboratory environments by focusing attention on features of the experimental design rather
than the (possibly strategic) behavior of subjects. It also allows provides a model for considering
alternative experimental designs that might reduce or eliminate the incidence of price bubbles.
3A n A g e n t - B a s e d M o d e l
W eb e g i nw i t had e s c r i p t i o no fa r t i ￿cial agent behavior in our baseline asset market environment.
This environment corresponds to one of the experimental designs ￿ Design #2 ￿ examined in Smith
et al. (1988). In this environment there are N = 9 agents who participate in T = 15 trading
rounds. There is a single asset that pays a random dividend at the end of each period. The number
of agents, their initial endowments, and the details of the dividend process are given in Table 1.
In each trading period, agents can either be buyers or sellers, and so we refer to them as
￿traders.￿ Each trader can submit buy (bid) or sell (ask) orders within each trading period.
Algorithmically, we choose a random sequence in which each of the 9 traders submits a single bid
or ask. A trading period t consists of a total of S such sequences, and S is chosen later in our
calibration so as to match the volume of trade. Let s =1 ,2,...,S index the random sequences
within period t.
When it is trader i￿s turn in sequence s of trading period t,w e￿rst randomly determine whether
he will be a buyer or seller. The probability that agent i is a buyer is πt and the probability he
is a seller is 1 − πt. The initial probability of being a buyer, π0,i s0 .5 and decreases over time.
6Speci￿cally the probability of being a buyer in trading period t is given by






is a parameter.9 This assumption endows the arti￿cial agents with a certain
foresight that there is a ￿nite end to the market: since the fundamental value of the asset is
declining over time and agents will have to sell any unit they have at the end of the session at the
default value, their tendency to buy decreases over time. We refer to this as the ￿weak foresight￿
assumption. Its primary role is to generate a reduction in transaction volume over time, consistent
with the experimental data. However, since it also means that asks will become more frequent than
bids, it can also lead to a reduction in transaction prices as well.
If trader i is a seller in sequence s and has a unit available for sale, then trader i submits an
ask price. If trader i is a buyer in sequence s and has suﬃcient cash balances, then trader i submits
a bid price. We refer to the these trading restrictions as ￿loose￿ budget constraints, because, by
contrast with Gode and Sunder￿s budget-constrained ZI model, bid or asks in our environment
are not made contingent on the intrinsic, fundamental value of the asset. Gode and Sunder (1993)
adopt a stricter, binding, no loss constraint, wherein an agent buys (sells) an item only if his private
value (cost) is higher (lower) than his bid (ask). In our environment where individuals can be both
buyers and sellers, this type of constraint would force agents to buy or sell at the intrinsic value,
and consequently price bubbles would never be observed. Hence, our adoption of the loose budget
constraint convention.
A second departure from Gode and Sunder￿s ZI approach, is our assumption that bid and
ask prices are not completely random, but depend in part on the mean transaction price from the
previous trading period, which we denote by pt−1.S p e c i ￿cally each trader￿s bid or ask price is a ￿xed
convex combination of the mean traded price from the previous period and a random price. This
assumption captures the behavioral notion that anchoring eﬀects are important - here the relevant
anchor for bids and asks is the previous period￿s mean traded price.10 This latter departure from
Gode and Sunder￿s ZI approach leads us to qualify our agents as ￿near￿zero intelligence￿ traders,
as our agents, by contrast with Gode and Sunder￿s agents, can recall the mean transaction price
from the previous period.






to ensure πt ∈ (0,0.5].
10Anchoring eﬀects are said to be operant if players￿ numeric estimates are related to some previously considered
benchmark, often the initial numeric value. For instance, Genesove and Mayer (2001) report that the nominal price
an owner paid for his Boston￿area condominium is a critical reference point in the determination of that owner￿s
subsequent asking price. Here, we take the benchmark to be the previous period￿s mean traded price.
7The random component in trader i￿s ask or bid in sequence s of period t is denoted by ui
t,s and





and κ > 0 is a parameter. Notice that while † is constant for all t, †t will decrease over time since
D
T
t decreases as t → T.
If trader i is a seller in sequence s of period t his ask price is given by:
ai
t,s =( 1− α)ui
t,s + αpt−1
where α ∈ (0,1) is a constant parameter that is the same for all traders that captures the weight
given to the anchor, pt−1. We assume that p0 = 0, as traders in period t = 1 have no prior history
upon which to base their pricing decisions. Seller i can submit an ask as long as he has a positive
share holding at sequence s of period t,i . e .yi
t,s > 0. Otherwise seller i does not submit an ask in
sequence s of period t.
Similarly, if trader i is a buyer in sequence s of period t, his bid price is given by:
bi
t,s =m i n
'
(1 − α)ui




Trader i can submit a bid as long as he has a positive cash holdings at sequence s of period t,i . e .
if xi
t,s > 0; otherwise no bid is submitted.
An issue that immediately arises is the choice of the appropriate upper bound, κ to place on
bid or ask prices. The intrinsic, fundamental value of each share in each trading period, D
T
t ,w a s
displayed on computer screens in the human subject experiments and so can be presumed to have




2 ,s oo n e
could argue that κ = 2 is an obvious choice. However, this choice would force agents to eventually
buy and sell at the intrinsic value. Hence, the parameter κ was chosen to be greater than 2; the
exact choice was determined on the basis of calibration to certain measures of the experimental
data as discussed in section 3.1. While such an upper bound may seem arbitrary, we note that
Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) have to impose an analogous and similarly arbitrary upper bound on
the ask range of sellers in the double auction environments they examine where agents are always
either buyers or sellers. Our upper bound on the bid/ask range amounts to a straightforward
generalization of Gode and Sunder￿s approach to the ￿trader￿ environment, where agents are free
to be both buyers and sellers.
8There are several things to note about our rules for bids and asks. Since traders can be both







. The only source of agent heterogeneity is the random component to
bids and asks which is necessary to generate trades; without it, given our anchoring assumption,
buyers and sellers would all submit the same prices and everyone would be just indiﬀerent between
trading or not trading. Notice further that agents￿ pricing decisions are non￿strategic. In particular,
the speculative, or ￿greater fool￿ explanation for price bubbles ￿ that agents buy at high prices
because they believe that they can sell to another agent (greater fool) at even higher prices ￿ is
not operative here, as all players have a common view of the range of possible prices and they do
not act strategically in any way. What is i m p o r t a n ti st h a tp r e v i o u sp e r i o dm e a nt r a d e dp r i c e s
act as an anchor for current period price determination. If the initial price anchor, p0 =0 ,a n d
α > 0 as we assume, then prices will necessarily increase over the ￿rst few trading periods. Indeed,





2 for suﬃciently large T, so prices will be greater than zero for all t. However,
since the fundamental value, D
T
t , decreases over time, mean traded prices can fall as well, due to
the shrinking upper bound on the random component of bids and asks.
This explanation for why prices ￿rst rise and then fall holds regardless of the value of ϕ.A s
we show in section 4.2, we need ϕ > 0 primarily to reduce trading volume, consistent with the
experimental results. With ϕ = 0, we would continue to get a hump￿shaped path for mean traded
prices but we would not get any decrease in transaction volume. Still, it would be incorrect to say
that ϕ has no eﬀect on traded prices. With ϕ > 0, there is a gradually increasing excess supply of
units towards the end of the market which contributes to the reduction in mean transaction prices.
Figure 1 shows the mean transaction price from the experimental data of Smith et al. (1988) for
Design #2 (labeled ￿Actual Price￿) along with several mean transaction price paths from simula-
tions of our agent￿based model. The mean price path from simulations of our optimally calibrated
baseline model is labeled ￿Sim Price ￿ Optimal Fit.￿ The details of the optimization procedure
we employed are discussed below. The path of mean transaction prices from our simulated model
exhibits the same hump￿shaped path as found in the experimental data.
In Figure 1, we contrast the path of prices from the ￿optimal ￿t￿ version of our model with
that from two diﬀerent variations on our model. The ￿rst, labeled ￿Sim Price for Phi = 0,￿ is a
simulation of our model where ϕ is set to zero and all other parameters are kept at their optimal
values. Consistent with our earlier discussion, in the absence of any weak foresight (i.e. when




2 , which is also plotted in Figure
1. When ϕ > 0, there are fewer buyers and more sellers as the asset market proceeds. This excess
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Figure 1: The mean transaction price path in the simulations and in the actual data.
10supply causes a further decrease in traded prices.
The second variation on our baseline model is aimed at delivering a larger fall-oﬀ or ￿crash￿ in
mean traded prices. For this variation of the model, the probability of being a buyer in period t is
now:
πt =m a x {0.5 − ϕtγ,0}
where γ > 1 is an additional behavioral parameter. The interpretation of this modi￿cation is that
there is a polynomially increasing desire by agents to sell units of the asset as the known, ￿nite
horizon approaches. We discovered that many values of γ > 1 yield a higher percentage of crashes
than in the baseline γ = 1 model, though these alternative models yield only a slightly better ￿tt o
the experimental data. In Figure 1, we present the mean traded price path from a simulation with
γ = 7, where other model parameters optimally ￿t for this level of γ - the price path labeled ￿Sim
Price - Polynomial Weak Foresight - Optimal Fit.￿ We chose γ = 7 because it created the best ￿t
(in terms of our sum of squared deviations (SS) objective function discussed in section 3.1) among
γ values in the set {1,3,5,7,9}. However, the improvement in terms of ￿t to the experimental data
of the γ > 1 version of our model was minimal. In the interest of keeping the number of behavioral
parameters to a minimum, we have chosen to consider the simpler, γ = 1 baseline model in the
remainder of the paper.
As in the laboratory studies and in actual markets, we use standard bid and ask improvement
rules which require that buyers improve on (i.e. raise) the current best bid price and sellers improve
on (i.e. lower) the current best ask price. If a bid price is submitted that is greater than or equal
to the current best ask price, the convention adopted here is the same one used in the laboratory
experiments: the unit is sold at the current best ask price. Similarly, if an ask price is submitted
that is less than or equal to the current best bid price, the unit is sold at that current best bid price,
again in line with the experimental practice. Once a unit is traded, we follow one of two conventions
for updating the best bid and ask prices. In the ￿rst, ￿continuous order book￿ convention, the one
used by Smith et al. (1988, 2000), the next best bid or ask price in the electronic order book
becomes the current best available bid or ask price. In the second ￿cleared order book￿ convention,
the one used by Lei et al. (2001) and Noussair et al. (2001), the order book is completely cleared
following each trade, so the ￿rst new bids and asks submitted following a trade become the current
best available. For the baseline simulations, we use the continuous order book convention since
this is the one used by Smith et al. (1988). However, we ￿nd that our results are not sensitive
to the type of order book convention.11 Following the end of each trading period, the order book
11For both conventions, we use the following rule: If a player has an outstanding limit order to buy (or sell) and
it is his turn again in the trading period to submit an order, we permit this player only to submit a bid (or ask).
11is completely cleared, a convention that is adopted in all of the laboratory studies. Dividends are
then paid out, and each agent￿s cash balances, xi, are adjusted accordingly.
Of course, during trading period t, any trades that agents make happen immediately and result
in an immediate (real￿time) adjustment to their cash balances, xi
t,s and asset endowments, yi
t,s.
Such trades may also aﬀect the bid ranges over which traders can submit bids, or whether they
may submit asks (e.g. if they have no units left to sell). Speci￿cally, an agent who has bought a
unit has reduced cash holdings and is therefore prevented from submitting bids that would exceed
current available cash holdings. In addition, an agent who has sold a unit, has one less unit to sell;
if the unit most recently sold was that agent￿s last unit, then that agent cannot submit any further
asks. These restrictions simply re￿ect the enforcement of budget constraints and are consistent
with the rules of the laboratory studies.
We note that a trading period t ends after S random sequences have played out. We then
calculate the mean traded price for the period, pt. The mean traded price in period t of session
(or simulation run) k, pk
t, is constructed as follows. Let volk
t denote the volume of transactions
measured as the number of shares traded in period t of session k.D e ￿ne p
b−a,k
t as the mean
bid￿ask spread price in period t of session k and de￿ne pk
th as the sale price of hth unit in period



















The mean transaction price, pk
t, is the quantity we use to measure the market price of a share.
3.1 Model Calibration
We used a simulated method of moments estimation procedure to calibrate the parameters of our
model ϕ, κ, S and α.S p e c i ￿cally, we adopted the following two step method of moments procedure
to optimally determine these parameter values.
1. In Step 1, we performed a univariate optimization over κ in the interval [0.5,8] for given ϕ,
S,a n dα, so as to minimize the weighted sum of squared deviations of the simulated mean
transaction price path from the actual mean price path in the experimental data plus the
weighted sum of the squared deviations of the simulated mean transaction volume path from
Therefore a player cannot have an ask and a bid in the order book simultaneously (and cannot buy from himself). In
the continuous order book convention, we permit a player to have only one outstanding limit order at any moment.
He can make a better bid or ask but then his older bid or ask is erased from the book.
12the actual mean volume path in the experimental data (denoted with an E superscript). In





















where TSU denotes the total stock of units endowed to all agents in an experimental
market, (TSU =
P
i yi). This function gives equal weight to ￿tting the mean transaction
price and the mean trading volume that is reported in the experimental data. The mean



















t denote the corresponding mean transaction price and the mean
volume in trading period t in the experimental data (over all sessions). This procedure is
nested in a grid for ϕ ∈ {0, 1
180, 2
180,..., 5
180}, S ∈ {1,2,...,10},a n dα ∈ {0,0.05,0.1,...,1}.
2. In Step 2, we use the sets of vectors (κ,α,ϕ,S) found in Step 1 as our starting points for
a 3-dimensional optimization procedure. We search for optimal (κ∗,α∗,ϕ∗)v a l u e sf o re a c h
integer S selected. We choose these initial points according to how small the sum of squares
function was for these vectors in Step 1. We use a simplex algorithm developed for MATLAB
to calculate the local optima around these starting points. Among all the locally optimal
values found, we pick the vector that implements the global minimum.
In the current problem, we are able to pin down the optimal values as:
κ∗ =4 .0846,α∗ =0 .8480,ϕ∗ =0 .01674, and S∗ =5 .
The basic purpose of Step 1 is to explore the surface of the probabilistic sum of squares function.
Although we use an unconstrained minimization algorithm in Step 2, we do not encounter any
locally optimal points outside the range of the parameters.
3.2 Statistics
In this section, we de￿ne some statistics that we will use in exploring the simulation results. An
important signature of an asset price bubble is persistently high prices ￿ prices in excess of what
13would be predicted by market fundamentals. The price amplitude is a commonly used measure
of the existence of bubbles. It is de￿ned as:





















for session k. An alternative measure of a bubble is the absolute intrinsic value deviation













for session k. Several authors also use an alternative measure to the absolute intrinsic value devi-













High transaction volume is another feature of bubbly asset markets. Following the literature,
we adopt a statistic known as the turnover rate which is de￿ned as the percentage of the total
stock of units that is sold in the entire market as a measure of transaction volume.
We also report statistics on transaction and price dynamics using our simulated data. The
transaction dynamics are captured by the mean volume of trade in each trading period. The price
dynamics are re￿ected in the normalized mean price deviation. The normalized mean price











We plot the average normalized mean price deviation and the average volume paths versus the
trading periods for our simulations.
W h i l ew er e p o r ta l lo ft h e s es t a t i s t i c sf o ro u rs i m ulations, not all of these statistics are reported
in the various experimental studies.12
4 Simulation Findings
4.1 Baseline Model
As mentioned above, our baseline model is that of Smith et al. (1988), Design #2, as described
i nT a b l e1 . W eh a v es i m u l a t e do u ra r t i ￿cial agent model with 9 traders in this environment for
12Diﬀerent authors have used diﬀerent bubble, price and volume statistics to present their results. Since we want to
compare our simulation results with existing experimental results, we calculate all statistics that have been reported
in the laboratory asset bubble literature for our simulated data.
14a total of K = 100 independent market sessions, each consisting of T = 15 periods, using the
optimal parameter vector we obtained from our simulated method of moments procedure. The
mean transaction price path from this simulation exercise (averaged over all 100 sessions) and for
the actual experimental data were presented earlier, in Figure 1. It should be no surprise that
the simulated mean price path tracks the actual mean price path rather well, as minimization of
the squared deviation between the simulated and the actual price path was one component of the
objective function for our simulated method of moments procedure.
In Figure 2 we present a plot of the normalized mean price deviation, NPD, and transaction
volume over time from our simulation and we also show the corresponding series from Smith et
al.￿s (1988) experimental data. The normalized deviation for the simulated market starts out 69%
















Transaction Volume - Smith et al. (1988) Design 2
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Norm. Mean Price Deviation - Smith et al. (1988) Design 2
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Figure 2: Simulation and Experiment Results.
below the intrinsic value in period 1 and increases up to 36% of the intrinsic value before fall oﬀ a
little in the last few trading periods. Transaction volume starts out averaging 10.90 units in period
151 and monotonically decreases to an average of 6.41 units by the ￿nal period 15. These paths
compare favorably with the experimental data, although again, this should not be too surprising
as our calibration was chosen so as to minimize deviations from actual price and volume paths.
We next turn to a comparison of some statistics calculated using our simulated data with
comparable statistics calculated using Smith et al.￿s (1988) experimental data, that we did not
attempt to explicitly match in our calibration exercise. Table 2 reports these statistics for both the
simulation data and Smith et al.￿s (1988) experimental data (if available).
Statistics Simulations Experiments
turnover % 685% 703%
PA 1.35 1.38
AIV D 7.94 5.68
IVD 2.13 N/A
pT − pT−1 < 0 < 0
Table 2: Statistics in the simulations and the experiments.
In the simulated data, the turnover in shares and price amplitude (PA) statistics are a close
match to the corresponding statistics in the experimental data. The absolute intrinsic value devia-
tion (AIVD) calculated using the experimental data is less closely matched by the simulated data
statistic. We note, however, that the experimental AIVD statistic reported in Table 2 is for all
designs, not just Design 2, of Smith et al. (1988).13
Smith et al. report rising traded prices in all 3 sessions with inexperienced subjects reported
for Design 2. They further report that mean traded prices fall in two of the three sessions towards
the end of the market. We also observe a similar hump-shaped pattern in mean traded prices in
all of our simulated markets.
Other authors have reported the experimental ￿nding that many transactions are recorded
at prices above the maximum fundamental value of a share or below the minimum fundamental
value of a share. They have pointed to this ￿nding as a sign of irrational behavior on the part of
agents. Indeed our simulation results also capture this feature of the experimental data. As Table
3 reveals, 34.42% of the total turnover is realized at prices higher than the maximum value of the
asset (calculated using the highest possible dividend realization in every period) and 10.91% of the
total turnover is realized at prices lower than the minimum value of the asset (using the lowest
possible dividend realization in every period).
13We found the absolute intrinsic value deviation for the Smith et al. (1988) data reported in the Noussair et al.
(2001) study. We calculated the mean price amplitude for the three Smith et al. (1988) Design 2 sessions by ourselves
using the data reported in their paper.
16Turnover Composition Simulations
under minimum fundamental value 10.91%
between min. and max. fund. val. 54.67%
above maximum fundamental value 34.42%
These data are not reported by Smith et al. (1988) for the experiments.
Table 3: Turnover in the Simulation Data
A real test for a simulation model such as ours is whether it captures more detailed features
of the experimental data. Repeatedly in laboratory bubble experiments, authors have found that
there is a signi￿cantly positive relationship between changes in the mean traded price and the
diﬀerence in the number of bids and asks recorded in the previous period. We next look at this
relationship using our simulated data.
Denote the number of bids in session k,p e r i o dt,b yBk
t and the number of asks (or oﬀers) in
session k,p e r i o dt,b yOk
t . Consider the following regression model:
pk
t − pk





k =1 ,...,N sessions
t =2 ,...,T periods
In the fully rational setting with risk neutral players, the estimate of the coeﬃcient a should be
equal to the negative of expected dividend payment, which is −0.12 in design #2 of Smith et al.
(1988), and the estimate of the coeﬃcient b should be equal to zero.
We estimate equation 1 using our entire simulation data set (100 simulations each consisting of
14 periods for t =2,...,15). Coeﬃcient estimates are given in Table 4. Using the simulated data,
the regression model cannot be rejected at the 1% level (F =1 3 1 .41, 1400 observations).
Regression Sessions b a t−stat p−value b b t−stat
p−value
(one-sided)
Simulations Cumulative 0.19 16.21 <0.01 0.033 7.92 <0.01
# 1 0/g r o w i n gp r i c e 0.2 5.4 < 0.05 − 0.01 − 2.1 < 0.05
Experiments #16 / bubble-crash 0.058 0.76 > 0.05 0.038 2.2 < 0.05
#18 / bubble-crash -1.6 -0.17 > 0.05 0.029 1.8 < 0.05
Table 4: Coeﬃcient Estimates of the Simulation and Experiment Data
We observe that the estimate of b b is signi￿cantly positive. Furthermore, the arti￿cial agents
do not discount the price of the asset in a rational manner, i.e. the estimated coeﬃcient b a is also
signi￿cantly positive, in contrast to the rational prediction that a = −0.12. Smith et al. (1988) run
17similar regressions separately for each session. These regression results are reproduced in Table 4
for comparison purposes. As this table reveals, consistent with our ￿ndings, Smith et al. ￿nd a
signi￿cantly positive estimate for b b i n2o u to f3s e s s i o n sa n das i g n i ￿cantly positive estimate for
b a in 1 out of 3 sessions. Moreover, our estimates of b b and b a both lie within the range of estimates
reported by Smith et al. (1988). We conclude that experimental subject and simulated agent
behavior is not dissimilar. In particular, when bids exceed (fall below) oﬀers, subsequent period
traded prices change in a predictable direction.
4.2 Comparative Statics
We performed some additional simulations using the Smith et al. (1988) Design 2, but with
extreme values of α or ϕ in place of the optimal choices for these parameter values. The purpose
of this exercise is to better comprehend the role played by these two key ￿behavioral￿ parameters
in the determination of agent behavior. In particular we consider how our model fares under
the alternative parameter vectors (κ∗,α =0 .95,ϕ∗,S∗), (κ∗,α =0 ,ϕ∗,S∗), and (κ∗,α∗,ϕ =0 ,S∗).
The results of these simulations are compared with the paths obtained using the optimal parameter
vector (κ∗,α∗,ϕ∗,S∗)=( 4 .0846,0.8480,0.01674,5) for prices and volume in Figure 3. The left panel
of this ￿gure plots the normalized mean price deviation path from the simulations while the right
panel plots the mean transaction volume path from the simulations. The optimal paths are shown
in the ￿rst row, the laboratory data are shown in the last (￿fth) row, and the other three rows
present results from the various nonoptimal choices for α or ϕ.
Consider ￿rst the two extreme values for α. Setting α = 0 (row 2 of Figure 3) eliminates
the anchoring eﬀect, so there is no reference point for the simulated agents￿ bids and asks. The






.S i n c e ϕ∗ > 0, the mean price




2 but falls below this value over time. Transaction volume declines
slightly over time as well for the same reason. At the other extreme, when α =0 .95 (row 3) there
is a heavy anchor at the previous period￿s mean transaction price. Since the initial price, p0 =0 ,
mean traded prices rise only very slowly above 0. The mean traded price eventually rises above
the fundamental value, but this rise does not coincide with the more rapid price rise that occurs
earlier in an experimental session. Furthermore, since the rise in prices takes longer, a fall-oﬀ
in prices is not observed within the same time-frame (15 periods) of the experimental markets.
Finally, consider the case where ϕ = 0, (row 4) so there is no foresight of the approaching ￿nite
horizon. Consequently there are always, on average, equal numbers of buyers and sellers in this
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics on α and ϕ in the Simulations.
exhibits no downward trend.
Summarizing these comparative static exercises, it seems that careful choices for our two main
￿behavioral￿ parameters, α and ϕ, are important for our results. In particular, setting either
parameter equal to zero worsens the performance of our model in terms of replicating the important
features of the experimental data. In the following sections, we use our calibrated model to predict
behavior in other asset market experiments that have been designed in an eﬀort to prevent bubbles
from occurring.
194.3 Asset Markets without Dividend Payments after Each Period
A recent paper by Smith et al. (2000) comes closest to eliminating laboratory bubbles in envi-
ronments where agents can be both buyers or sellers. Their A1 design, involves a T =1 5p e r i o d
market with no dividend payments. The only money paid to subjects for asset holdings is the
default value of the asset at the end of the market, following the end of period 15. Their hypothesis
is that dividend payments at the end of each trading period, as in Smith et al. (1988), focuses
traders￿ attention too myopically on the near term; by concentrating the dividend payoﬀ into a
single end-of-market payment the hope was that agents would be more far-sighted (and homoge-
neous in their expectations) and, as a consequence, bubbles would become less likely. There is some
support for this hypothesis in their experimental data as we discuss below. Still, they report some
market sessions where price bubbles continue to arise.






Class I ($3.5;4) 3
Class II ($9.9;2) 3
Class III ($13.1;1) 2
Class IV ($16.3;0) 2
Dividends d =$ 0
Intrinsic Value of a Share D
T
1 =$ 2 .4
Buy-out Value of a Share DT
T+1 ∈ {$1.8,$2.4,$3}a D
T
T+1 =$ 2 .4
a Buy-out value $1.8 will occur with p = 1
4, $2.4 will occur with p = 1
2, $3.0 will occur with p = 1
4.
Table 5: Smith et al. (2000) Experimental Design A1 Sessions 1-6
In applying our near-zero-intelligence agent model to this environment, we do not re-calibrate
the model parameters to best ￿t the traded price and volume paths in the experimental data.
Instead we use the parameter values for our model that were optimal for the Smith et al. (1988)
experiment. Our aim is to use our calibrated baseline model to predict behavior in the Smith et al.
(2000) experiment and then compare it with the actual data. This provides a more rigorous test of
our arti￿cial agent model than if we were to re-calibrate it to match features of the data reported
by Smith et al. (2000). Using the optimal parameters for the Smith et al. (1988) design, but the
experimental design given in Table 5 for Smith et al. (2000), we conducted a simulation exercise
similar to the one previously discussed: K = 100 independent market sessions, each consisting of
T=15 periods with 10 traders of the various classes given in Table 5.
In Table 6, we display some statistics from our simulation of the Smith et al. (2000) environment
20and compare these with the corresponding statistics from the experimental data. While our ￿ti s
Statistics Simulations Experiments
turnover % 741% 559%
PA 1.17 0.78
AIV D 6.29 N/A
IVD 2.42 3.96
pT − pT−1 < 0 < 0
Table 6: Simulation and Experiment Statistics.
not exact, we do observe comparable values for the turnover percentage, the price amplitude and
the intrinsic value deviations in both the simulated and the experimental data. Note in particular
that mean price amplitude as reported in Table 6 falls relative to the same measure reported for
our baseline simulation calibrated to match features of the data reported in Smith et al. (1988):
compare the mean price amplitude reported Table 2 with that in Table 6. A similar drop in price
amplitude is found in the Smith et al. (2000) experimental data relative to the Smith et al. (1988)
experimental data, (again, compare Tables 2 and 6) which supports the claim that price bubbles
are less likely in the Smith et al. (2000) environment.
Turnover Composition Simulations
under minimum fundamental value 13.16%
between min. and max. fund. val. 52.34%
above maximum fundamental value 34.50%
These statistics are not reported by Smith et al. (2000) for the experimental data.
Table 7: Turnover in the Simulation Data.
In Table 7 we decompose the turnover in units. We see that 34.50% of all turnover in units
is realized at prices higher than the maximum fundamental value while 13.16% of all turnover is
realized at prices lower than the minimum fundamental value of the asset in the simulation. This
￿nding simply re￿ects the irrationality of our simulated agents.
The paths of transaction prices (normalized deviation of prices from intrinsic value) and volume
in the simulations are given in Figure 4. In this model, the anchoring eﬀect causes the mean
transaction price deviation to start low and to get higher as trading proceeds. The wide bidding
window causes the mean transaction price to rise over the fundamental value. As the bidding
window stays constant, the fall in traded prices at the end of the asset market is caused by the
positive value of the weak foresight parameter ϕ∗.
We re-estimate regression equation (1) using the data generated under this design. With ra-
tional, risk neutral bidders, we should observe a = 0, corresponding to the dividend payment per
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Figure 4: Normalized Intrinsic Value Deviation and Volume Paths in the Smith et al. (2000) Design









are using this measure instead of the Mean Price Deviation, as this was the statistic reported by Smith et al. (2000).
We note that Smith et al. (2001) do not report transaction volume for any of their experimental sessions.
22period in this environment as well as b =0 .T h ec o e ﬃcient estimates are given in Table 8. Using
the simulation data, we cannot reject the model at the 1% level (F = 125.41, 1400 observations).
We observe a signi￿cantly positive coeﬃcient estimate for b using the simulation data. Smith et
Regression Sessions b a t−stat p−value b b t−stat p−value
Simulations Cumulative 0.21 26.41 < 0.01 0.032 11.20 < 0.01
#1 N/A N/A N/A -0.005 N/A N/A
#2 N/A N/A N/A 0.016 N/A N/A
Experimentsab #3 N/A N/A N/A -0.001 N/A N/A
#4 N/A N/A N/A 0.078 N/A N/A
#5 N/A N/A N/A 0.008 N/A N/A
#6 N/A N/A N/A 0.003 N/A N/A
a Smith et al. (2000) do not report estimates of ￿ a and do not report t-ratios or p-values for their estimates of ￿ b.
b Sessions 7 and 8 of Smith et al. (2000) are not reported in this table as their dividend and endowment
structures were quite diﬀerent. However, the price dynamics of Sessions 7 and 8 are incorporated in the Design
A1 price plot presented in Figure 4, because this ￿gure was the only one available showing price dynamics.
Table 8: Coeﬃcient Estimates of the Simulation and Experiment Data.
al. (2000) report coeﬃcient estimates for b separately for each session, and these are reproduced
in Table 8 for comparison purposes. Most of their coeﬃcient estimates for b are positive (4 out of
6); they do not report p−values for these coeﬃcients. As Table 8 reveals, our estimate for b lies
within the range of estimates reported by Smith et al. (2001). We conclude that our model yields
the same relationship between price changes and bid￿oﬀer volume found in the experimental data.
4.4 Asset Markets with a Constant Fundamental Value
Noussair et al. (2001) report on a laboratory asset market experiment similar to the Smith et al.
(1988) design, but where the fundamental value of the asset remains constant over all T trading
periods. Their main ￿nding is that in half (4 out of 8) of their experimental sessions price bubbles
arise, but in the other half, bubbles are not observed. Therefore, having a constant fundamental
value as opposed to a decreasing fundamental value does not eliminate bubbles, though it might
reduce their frequency. They have random dividend payments in each period, but their dividend
payments have a constant expected value of zero. The design speci￿cations (for the Purdue sessions)
a r eg i v e ni nT a b l e9 : 14 In this environment, there are usually 10 players each with 10 units of the
asset and a $12.5 cash endowment. The dividends are drawn from the set {− $0.03, −$0.02, $0.005,
14In the other sessions run at the University of Grenoble, the same design was used with a slight diﬀerence in the







Class I ($12.5;10) 10
Dividends d ∈ {−$0.03,−$0.02,$0.005,$0.045}a d =$ 0
Intrinsic Value of a Share D
T
1 =$ 0 .45
Buy-out Value of a Share DT
T+1 =$ 0 .45
a Each dividend outcome will occur with probability 1
4.
Table 9: Noussair et al. (2001) Purdue Design.
$0.045} with equal probability so that the expected payment is zero (and therefore constant). The
buy-out value of a unit of the asset is $0.45.
Applying our model to this environment, we did not re-calibrate the model parameters. Instead,
we again used the optimal parameter vector we found for the Smith et al. (1988) experiment. We
conducted K = 100 independent market sessions each involving T =1 5p e r i o d sa n d1 0t r a d e r s .
Our aim was to assess the performance of our calibrated baseline model to a diﬀerent experimental
environment by comparing statistics from the simulated data with those reported by Noussair et
al. (2001) for the experimental data. Table 10 reports these statistics for both the simulations and
for Noussair et al.￿s (2001) experimental data.
Statistics Simulations Experiments
turnover % 142% 419%
PA 1.07 0.52
AIV D 0.19 0.63
IVD 0.015 N/A
pT − pT−1 < 0 < 0
Table 10: Simulation and Experiment Statistics.
We see that the rate of turnover of shares in the simulated data is much lower than in the
experimental data. The amplitude of bubbles in the simulation are around twice the amplitude
of bubbles in the experiment. As Table 11 reveals, we observe that a small percentage of the
Turnover Composition Simulations
under minimum fundamental value 0.02%
between min. and max. fund. val. 81.98%
above maximum fundamental value 18.00%
These data are not reported by Noussair et al. (2001) for the experiments.
Table 11: Turnover in the Simulation Data.
transactions in the simulated data, about 18.00%, are realized at prices higher than the maximum
24value of the asset. Similarly, almost none of the transactions are realized at prices lower than the
minimum fundamental value.
Noussair et al. (2001) are the only authors studying asset price bubbles in the laboratory who
provide an operational de￿nition of a bubble. They say that a bubble occurs if one of the following
t w oc o n d i t i o n si sm e t :
￿(a) The median transaction price in ￿ve consecutive periods is at least 50 units of
experimental currency (about 13.9%) greater than the fundamental value. (b) The
average price is at least two standard deviations (of transaction prices) greater than the
fundamental value for ￿ve consecutive periods.￿(Noussair et al. (2001), p. 94).
Using this de￿nition, Noussair et al. ￿nd, as noted above, that price bubbles obtain in 4 out
of 8 sessions. Of these 4 bubbly sessions, Noussair et al. report that just 2 experienced a price
crash. However, in all bubbly sessions, prices decrease towards the end of each experimental asset
market. Adopting the same criterion, we ￿nd a much higher percentage of bubbles in our simulation
exercise: 95 of our 100 simulated markets met either criterion a or b.
Figure 5 shows the normalized mean price deviation and transaction volume paths for the
Noussair et al. (2001) environment. This ￿gure plots the mean experimental price and volume
data only for the Noussair et al. (2001) sessions where bubbles obtained. Though the ￿to ft h e
simulated data to the experimental data is not so impressive, the fact remains that even with our
generic calibration, we observe bubbles in the simulation data for the Noussair et al. (2001) design.
In this laboratory environment, as in the others, the anchoring eﬀect causes transaction prices
to start low and to rise as trading proceeds. The prices rise over the expected fundamental value
due to there being a wide bid range. The bid range stays constant in the Noussair et al. (2001)
environment since the fundamental value is constant. The prices only start to fall because of the
weak foresight of the simulated agents who submit less and less buy orders and more and more sell
orders as the market proceeds.
We have again estimated regression equation (1) for this design. In the rational case with risk
neutral bidders we should ￿nd that a = 0 corresponding to the dividend payment per period and
that b =0 . The coeﬃcient estimates are given in Table 12 for the simulation and the experimental
data respectively. We observe signi￿cantly positive estimates for both a and b using the simulation
data. Again, using the simulation data, we cannot reject the model at the 1% level (F = 140.32,
1400 observations). Noussair et al. (2001) ￿nd that b a and b b are signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero in
only three sessions, and their values are positive in those three sessions.
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Figure 5: Normalized Mean Price Deviation and Volume Paths in the Noussair et al. (2001) Design
(with Bubbles) and Simulations
Regression Sessions b a t−stat p−value b b t−stat p−value
Simulations Cumulative 0.046 26.40 < 0.01 0.0030 11.85 < 0.01
G#1/ no bubble 0.0018 0.44 > 0.05 0.00040 0.35 > 0.05
G#2/ no bubble 0.015 2.26 < 0.05 0.0013 2.68 < 0.05
G#3/ bubble-crash 0.013 1.29 > 0.05 0.0018 2.05 < 0.05
Experiments G#4/ no bubble 0.022 1.43 > 0.05 0.0011 0.77 > 0.05
G#5/ bubble-crash 0.0039 0.059 > 0.05 -0.00013 -0.17 > 0.05
P#1/ bubble 0.0078 0.48 > 0.05 -0.00023 -0.17 > 0.05
P#2/ no bubble 0.0014 2.36 < 0.05 -0.00025 -1.13 > 0.05
P#3/ bubble 0.0080 2.35 < 0.05 0.00075 2.61 < 0.05
Table 12: Coeﬃcient Estimates of the Simulation and Experiment Data.
264.5 Discussion
The bubbles observed in the simulations of the Noussair et al. (2001) and Smith et al. (2000) designs
have smaller price amplitude, smaller absolute intrinsic value deviation than in the simulations
based on the Smith et al. (1988) design ￿ compare Tables 6 and 10 with Table 2. The experimental
bubbles were indeed smaller in the other two designs as compared with the experimental bubbles
reported in Smith et al. (1988). Hence, our simulations capture this feature of the experiments
quite well.
On the other hand, our simulations are far from perfect at tracking the price and volume paths
in the Smith et al. (2000) and Noussair et al. (2001) designs using the parameters calibrated for
the Smith et al. (1988) design. Setting aside the obvious explanation ￿ that we use a calibration
that is not optimized for these diﬀerent experimental designs ￿ an alternative explanation might
be that the market environment of Smith et al. (2000) and, especially, that of Noussair et al.
(2001) are considerably simpler for subjects to comprehend than the original Smith et al. (1988)
environment. In these simpler environments, subjects may come to understand the fundamental
value of the asset more clearly, and may take a more rational approach to submitting bids or asks.
If this were the case, our model of near￿zero￿intelligence traders might be less appropriate as a
model of human subject behavior, even among relatively inexperienced subjects.
Still, while the simulation model, calibrated to ￿t the Smith et al. (1988) data does not predict
the data from other experimental designs so well, our main ￿nding, that price bubbles and crashes
persist in these other environments is consistent with the experimental ￿ndings. Using our model,
one would be led to the same conclusion that Noussair et al. make: ￿the bubble phenomenon is
a characteristic of a more general class of environments, not only the commonly studied declining
fundamental value case,￿ (Noussair et al. p. 97). This consistency gives us some con￿dence in the
predictive power of our model which we explore further in the following sections.
4.6 Asset Markets with an Inde￿nite Horizon
One diﬃculty with the laboratory asset price bubble designs discussed above is their use of a known,
￿nite horizon for the asset market. If the asset is known to be worth zero after a certain date or
to have some ￿xed cash-out value, it seems likely that prices will fall to these values as the ￿nite
horizon looms, as subject eventually apply backward induction. Of course in real asset markets,
the horizon over which assets may generate dividends and capital gains is inde￿nite, and so it
would seem to be of some interest to examine whether asset price bubbles and crashes can arise in
such inde￿nite horizon environments. Camerer and Weigelt (1993) present results from a double
27auction market where the asset that subjects traded was stochastically lived. They were interested
in whether prices converged to the fundamental competitive equilibrium price, equal to the present
discounted value of dividends. They found that with either inexperienced subjects, convergence to
equilibrium was ￿slow and unreliable,￿ primarily because traders are more uncertain of what prices
will be in future periods, a problem that does not arise in repetitions of the static double auction
environment. Camerer and Weigelt (1993) report that in some sessions prices slowly converged
to the fundamental value while in other sessions there was no tendency towards convergence at
all, with prices remaining either persistently above or persistently below the fundamental value for
sustained periods of time.
We implement an inde￿nite horizon asset market in the same way that Camerer and Weigelt
do: we specify a constant probability that the market (or asset) will continue (or live) from one
trading period to the next. However we depart from Camerer and Weigelt in how we model the
stochastic dividend process. In Camerer and Weigelt￿s paper, the dividend an agent receives from
holding a unit of the asset at the end of each period depends on the agent￿s type for that period
(high, medium or low dividend recipient). Heterogeneity of types is what promotes trade in their
model. Since we already have agent heterogeneity in the form of the random components to bids
and asks, we suppose instead that the dividend process is the same for all traders, which is more
in line with the prior literature on bubbles in laboratory asset markets.
Speci￿cally, we build on the design of Noussair et al. (2001), since the fundamental value of the
asset in the inde￿nite horizon environment will also be constant. Table 13 gives our experimental
design for the inde￿nite horizon environment. We suppose there are 10 traders in each session and
each one of them is endowed with 10 units of the asset and $12.50 in cash. A market consists of an
inde￿nite number of trading periods. When a market ends, each remaining unit of the asset has a
buy￿out value of 0. There are also dividend payments after each trading period having expected
value d =$ 0 .03. The distribution of possible dividend values reported in Table 13 was obtained by
simply adding $.03 to the dividend values in the Noussair et al. (2001) design (c.f. Table 9). At
the end of each trading period t the market continues with another trading period with probability
pc =0 .9 (Camerer and Weigelt chose pc = .85), which can also be interpreted as a discount factor.
Thus, the number of trading periods T remaining in a market session at the start of period t
becomes a random variable with Et[T]= 1
1−pc = 10. It follows that the fundamental value of a
share at the start of any trading period is d
1−pc = 0.03
0.1 =0 .3.
We do not use the weak foresight parameter in this experimental design, i.e. we set ϕ =0 .
The weak foresight parameter exogenously decreases the probability of being a buyer after each






Class I ($12.5;10) 10
Dividends d ∈ {$0,$0.01,$0.35,$0.075}a d =$ 0 .03
Intrinsic Value of a Share D
E(T)
1 =$ 0 .30
Buy-out Value of a Share D
E(T)
E(T)+1 =$ 0
a Each dividend outcome will occur with probability 1
4.
Table 13: Inde￿nite Horizon Design with Continuation Probability pc =0 .95.
more trading periods to be played. Hence, there is no need for the weak foresight parameter. Aside
from this change, the parameters are the ones we found to be optimal for the Smith et al. (1988)
design, (κ∗ =4 .0846,α∗ =0 .8480, and S∗ =5 ) .
Table 14 gives the simulation statistics over 100 sessions. The mean number of trading periods
for each session (market) in the 100 session sample was 11.12, with a standard deviation of 9.84
periods. The sample maximum number of trading periods in any single market was 48 and the
minimum number was 1 trading period. We observe both high turnover and price amplitude in






pT − pT−1 ≈ 0
Table 14: Simulation Statistics with In￿nite Horizon.
price level increases steadily to almost one and a half times the fundamental value within the ￿rst
8 periods of a session. Here, the parameter κ is still set at 4.0846, but ϕ =0 ,s oi nF i g u r e6t h e
normalized price deviation should converge to (κ/2) − 1 ≈ 1.04. Since the number of observations
with more than 25 trading periods was few, we show data for the ￿rst 25 periods only. However,
a careful inspection of the data after period 25 shows that indeed the normalized price deviation
￿uctuates around 1.04 as predicted by the model. The interesting prediction of this simulation is
that although we have a bubble, the bubble never bursts. The transaction price does not decrease
from period T − 1t oT in general. This is due to the fact that, after each trading period that has
been reached, one can expect 10 more periods in the session. Hence, the fundamental value of the
asset is constant. This leads to a constant bid interval. Since there is no weak foresight in the
inde￿nite horizon model, prices do not change, i.e. the environment is stationary.
















Transaction Volume - Inf. Horizon with p
c=0.9 First 25 Periods
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Figure 6: Normalized Mean Price Deviation and Volume Paths in the Inde￿nite Horizon Design
Simulations.
Turnover Composition Simulations
under minimum fundamental value 0.00%
between min. and max. fund. val. 100.00%
above maximum fundamental value 0.00%
Table 15: Turnover in the Simulation Data.
30As seen in Table 15, all of the activity is observed at prices between the maximum and minimum
fundamental value. At any period, the maximum value of the asset is determined as the maximum





1−pc =$0.75. Similarly, the minimum value of the asset





Next, we estimate the regression equation (1) relating the change in traded prices to the diﬀer-
ence between buy and sell oﬀers in the previous period, equation. We ￿nd that b a is both positive
and signi￿cant, but b b is negative and not statistically signi￿cant. (See Table 16). This time using
the simulated data, we can reject the model at 10% level (F =1 .54, 1012 observations from 100
sessions). It should be noted that this result is obtained in the absence of the weak foresight pa-
rameter in the model. With risk neutral rational bidders, we should observe a = 0 corresponding
Regression Sessions b a t−stat p−value b b t−stat p−value
Simulations Cumulative 0.030 29.96 < 0.01 -0.00026 -1.24 > 0.1
Table 16: Coeﬃcient Estimates of the Simulation Data.
to the change in the dividend payment per period and b =0 .
These ￿ndings are not inconsistent with those reported by Camerer and Weigelt (1993), even
though there are some diﬀerences between their approach and our own as noted above. In particular,
they report sessions where prices remained well above the fundamental equilibrium price with no
tendency toward convergence (c.f. our ￿ndings with Figures 2, 3, 13 and 14 of the Camerer-Weigelt
paper). While we have not tested the inde￿nite horizon market design we examine here with human
subjects, we think it would be of interest to do so. If our prediction is correct, we should see a
sustained departure of asset prices above their fundamental value and no crashes, at least among
inexperienced subjects.
4.7 Asset Markets Without Opportunities for Speculation
In an important paper, Lei et al. (2001) show that speculative motives are not needed to generate
bubbles in experimental asset markets. They consider a design where players are ex-ante classi￿ed
as either buyers or sellers. A buyer can only buy shares and a seller can only sell shares. Players
remain in the same role for the duration of a session. By preventing buyers from acting also as
sellers, speculative explanations for bubbles (e.g. the greater fool hypothesis) are eﬀectively shut
down. Despite shutting down the possibility of speculation, Lei et al. (2001) report that asset price
bubbles arise in their experimental sessions. This result refutes the conjecture that speculative
behavior is the source of the laboratory asset price bubble phenomena. In this section we apply our
31model to the Lei et al. (2001) environment. As noted earlier, our asset price bubble explanation
does not rely on any speculative behavior. Instead it relies on the anchoring and weak foresight
assumptions.
In the Lei et al. environment, sellers are endowed with shares and buyers are endowed with
money. Since buyers and sellers are ￿xed throughout a session, we do not use a decreasing proba-
bility for being a buyer (weak foresight assumption), or for that matter, any probabilistic device for
determining who is a buyer or a seller. In this sense, the Lei et al. model is quite diﬀerent from the
laboratory environments we have previously considered. Aside from this one change, however, our
model is the same as before. In particular, loose budget constraints remain in place and buyers and
sellers continue to use the mean traded price of the previous period as an anchor for their current
bids and asks, which continue to also have a random component. There continues to be a common
upper bound to the bid ask range equal to κ times the fundamental value of the asset. Therefore,
the loose budget constraint parameter κ, the anchoring weight parameter α, and the number of
trading sequences in a period S are the only model parameters that need to be calibrated for this
design.
The number of periods in a market is set at T = 12, as in Lei et al. (2001). The initial








Dividends d ∈ {$0.0667,$0.133}a d =0 .10
Intrinsic Value of a Share D
T
1 =$ 1 .20
Buy-out Value of a Share DT
T+1 =$ 0
a Each dividend outcome will occur with probability 1
2.
Table 17: Lei et al. (2001) Experimental No-Speculation Design.
ronment diﬀers considerably from the ones we have previously examined, we chose to re-calibrate
our simulation model using a similar optimization algorithm to the one provided for the designs
with speculation. We used the same two￿step simulated method of moments procedure described
in section 3.1, modi￿ed for the fact that we no longer search over values of the weak foresight
parameter, ϕ. The optimal parameters were as follows: the number of trading sequences S∗ =3 ,
15Lei et al. (2001) use the cleared order book convention in their experiments. In the simulations we report here
we also use this convention. We note that the particular order book convention used does not aﬀect the simulation
results extensively.
32the loose budget constraint parameter κ∗ =3 .5123, and the anchoring parameter α∗ =0 .6.
We ran K = 100 independent market sessions of our model with the calibration as described
in the last section. Table 18 reports the statistics both for the simulations and for the actual
experimental data.
Statistics Simulations Experiments
turnover % 92% 82%
PA 3.63 3.48
AIV D 0.49 N/A
IVD 0.40 N/A
pT − pT−1 < 0 < 0
Table 18: Simulation and Experiment Statistics.
We observe that asset turnover is lower relative to other designs, as it also is in the experimental
data. We further note that values for the price amplitude, the absolute intrinsic value deviation
and the intrinsic value deviation in the simulated data are a very close match to the experimental
data.
In Figure 7 we plot the normalized mean price deviation and transaction volume from the
simulated data and for the actual Lei et al. (2001) experimental data. The normalized mean-price
deviation is about -30% of initial fundamental value in period 1 and it increases up to less than
60% in period 5 before falling back to just 28% in last period. This provides strong evidence of a
bubble-crash pattern in this design. Indeed, Lei et al. (2001) claim that there is a bubble￿crash
pattern in two of their three No-Speculation treatments.
In the simulations, transaction volume starts high at 6.5 units in the ￿rst period, and stays
fairly steady for the ￿rst 9 periods, before falling oﬀ and ending up below 5 in period 12. We
observe in Table 19 that 79.20% of the total turnover is traded at prices higher than the maximum
value of the asset. On the other hand, only 5.38% of the total turnover are traded at prices lower
than the minimum value of asset. In the actual experimental data fewer units are traded at prices
higher than the maximum value and more units are traded at prices lower than the minimum value
- see Table 19. Still, our simulation ￿ndings are broadly consistent with the laboratory ￿ndings:
some agents are trading irrationally.
Turnover Composition Simulations Experiments
under minimum fundamental value 5.38% 16.67%
between min. and max. fund. val. 15.42% 44.44%
above maximum fundamental value 79.20% 38.89%
Table 19: Turnover in the Simulation and Experiment Data.
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Figure 7: Average Mean Price and Volume Paths in the Simulation Data
34In our agent-based model, the anchoring eﬀect causes traded prices to start low and to become
higher as trading proceeds. However, at some point, buyers start running out of money, since they
no longer have the option of re￿selling units and replenishing their cash balances with capital gains
as in the trader market environment. Consequently, transaction prices fall, as sellers compete to
transact with fewer buyers. Transaction volume falls a little as well, especially towards the end of
the market and the market experiences a ￿crash￿. Notice that this explanation for the bubble-crash
phenomenon does not rely on any foresight of the ￿nite horizon.
We again estimate regression equation (1) using simulated data for this design. With rational,
risk neutral bidders we should observe a = −0.1 corresponding to the change in the expected
dividend payment per period and b =0 . The coeﬃcient estimates are given in Table 20 for the
simulation and experimental data, respectively. We ￿nd that b a is signi￿cantly negative and b b is
positive, though not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. Lei et al. report that for the experimental
data b a is signi￿cantly negative and b b is signi￿cantly positive.16 We can reject the model in the
simulation data at 10% level with F =0.83 (with 1100 observations obtained from 100 sessions
and 11 periods for t =2,...,12). These results suggest once again that our model does a fair job of
characterizing the major features of laboratory asset bubble phenomenon, and is also capable of
capturing some of the more subtle features of the data.
Regression Sessions b a t−stat p−value b b t−stat p−value
Simulations Cumulative − 0.036 −5.65 < 0.01 0.0008 0.22 > 0.05
Experiments Cumulative -0.2147 -9.6293 < 0.05 0.002 11.80 <0.05
Table 20: Coeﬃcient Estimates of the Simulation and Experiment Data
5 Conclusion
We have developed a simple, agent-based behavioral model with the aim of understanding the
phenomenon of asset price bubbles and crashes among inexperienced subjects as reported in a
number of laboratory studies beginning with Smith et al. (1988). We turned to agent￿based
modeling because standard theoretical models impose assumptions that are either unsatis￿ed or
are too restrictive for the double auction environment of the laboratory studies. Indeed, rational
asset pricing models would predict that agents placed in the laboratory environments would not
engage in any trade whatsoever.
16We note that Lei et al. (2001) use the median transaction price in their estimates and statistics.
35Our simple agent-based behavioral model builds on the idea of using budget constrained, zero￿
intelligence traders as pioneered by Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997). The ZI approach is not intended
as a commentary on the rationality of human subjects. Rather, this approach eﬀectively lays bare
the importance of institutions, e.g. trading rules, procedures, and other features of the market
environment relative to human decision-making skills in the determination of observed market
outcomes. We have had to modify the Gode and Sunder ZI methodology in several ways to address
the laboratory price bubble phenomenon but the resulting model continues to focus attention on the
role played by the features of the laboratory asset market, in particular, whether there is a ￿nite
or in￿nite horizon, whether the fundamental value of the asset is decreasing over time and the
frequency/timing of dividend payments. We have also addressed the ￿greater fool￿ hypothesis that
asset price bubbles arise from speculative behavior on the part of players who buy at high prices in
hopes of selling at even higher prices. Our anchoring explanation for price increases in the initial
periods of a market session does not rely on any kind of speculative motive; it is purely backward
looking. Accordingly, we are able to obtain price bubbles in buyer￿seller markets, such as the one
considered by Lei et al. (2001) where speculation motives are explicitly precluded. Our behavioral
model, utilizing both anchoring and weak foresight, is the ￿rst, and to our knowledge, the only
model that has been oﬀered to explain the robust ￿nding of laboratory asset price bubbles that
has fascinated so many experimental economists. Our model not only generates price bubbles and
crashes that are qualitatively similar to those found in the experimental data, but in many instances
we are close to obtaining the right magnitudes in price changes, volume and other statistics as well.
Our model can also replicate other, more subtle ￿ndings from the experimental studies such as the
regression estimated relationship between changes in traded prices and diﬀerences in the volume of
bids relative to oﬀers. A testable implication of our model is that both anchoring eﬀects and ￿nite
horizons matter; eliminating the ability of traders to condition on past transaction prices (e.g. by
severely restricting the information they receive) and replacing the ￿nite horizon with an inde￿nite
horizon might work to eliminate bubbles and crashes with inexperienced subjects. Of course, we
emphasize that our model cannot explain why bubbles and crashes cease to obtain as players gather
experience; to explain that we would have to add further structure to the model, e.g. that agents
are concerned with the payoﬀ consequences of their actions. As we mentioned at the beginning of
the paper, our model seeks only to address the behavior of inexperienced players, which has also
been the primary focus of the experimental literature on bubbles since Smith et al.￿s (1988) paper.
We leave the modeling of how experience aﬀects trading behavior in laboratory asset markets to
future research.
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